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| {{DISPLAYTITLE:''De dicto'' and ''de re''}}
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| '''''De dicto''''' and '''''de re''''' are two phrases used to mark important distinctions in [[intensional statement]]s, associated with the intensional operators in many such statements. The distinctions are most recognized in [[philosophy of language]] and [[metaphysics]].[http://semanticsarchive.net/Archive/DU3YTgyN/Attributive,%20referential,%20de%20dicto%20and%20de%20re.pdf]
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| The literal translation of the phrase "''de dicto''" is "of (the) word", whereas ''de re'' translates to "of (the) thing". The original meaning of the Latin locutions is useful for understanding the living meaning of the phrases, in the distinctions they mark. The distinction is best understood by examples of intensional contexts of which we will consider three: a context of thought, a context of desire, and a context of [[modal logic|modality]].
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| ==Context of thought==
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| There are two possible interpretations of the sentence “Peter believes someone is out to get him”. On one interpretation, ‘someone’ is unspecific and Peter suffers a general paranoia; he believes that it is true that a person is out to get him, but does not necessarily have any beliefs about who this person may be. What Peter believes is that the predicate ‘is out to get Peter’ is satisfied. This is the ''de dicto'' interpretation.
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| On the ''de re'' interpretation, ‘someone’ is specific, picking out some particular individual. There is some person Peter has in mind, and Peter believes that person is out to get him.
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| In the context of thought, the distinction helps us explain how people can hold seemingly self-contradicting beliefs. Say Lois Lane believes Clark Kent is weaker than Superman. Since Clark Kent is Superman, taken ''de re'', Lois’s belief is untenable; the names ‘Clark Kent’ and ‘Superman’ pick out an individual in the world, and a person (or super-person) cannot be stronger than himself. Understood ''de dicto'', however, this may be a perfectly reasonable belief, since Lois is not aware that Clark and Superman are one and the same.
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| ==Context of desire== | | '''source''' |
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| Consider the sentence "Jana wants to marry the tallest man in Fulsom County". It could be read either ''de dicto'' or ''de re''; the meanings would be different. One interpretation is that Jana wants to marry the tallest man in Fulsom County, whomever he might be. On this interpretation, what the statement tells us is that Jana has a certain unspecific desire; what she desires is that a certain situation should obtain, namely, ''Jana's marrying the tallest man in Fulsom County''. The desire is directed at that situation, regardless of how it is to be achieved. The other interpretation is that Jana wants to marry a certain man, who in fact happens to be the tallest man in Fulsom County. Her desire is for ''that man'', and she desires herself to marry ''him''. Again, the first interpretation, "Jana desires that she marry the tallest man in Fulsom County", is the ''de dicto'' interpretation. The second interpretation, "Of the tallest man in Fulsom County, Jana desires that she marry him", is the ''de re'' interpretation.
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| Another way to understand the distinction is to ask what Jana would want if the man who was the tallest man in Fulsom County at the time the original statement was made were to lose his accolade to a 9 foot tall immigrant, such that he was no longer the tallest man in Fulsom County. If she continued to want to marry that man – and, importantly, perceived this as representing no change in her desires – then she could be taken to have meant the original statement in a ''de re'' sense. If she no longer wanted to marry that man but instead wanted to marry the ''new'' tallest man in Fulsom County, and saw this as a continuation of her earlier desire, then she meant the original statement in a ''de dicto'' sense.
| | ==Demos== |
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| ==Context of modality==
| | Here are some [https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?title=Special:ListFiles/Frederic.wang demos]: |
| The number of discovered chemical elements is 117.
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| Take the sentence "The number of [[chemical elements]] is necessarily greater than 100". Again, there are two interpretations as per the ''de dicto / de re'' distinction. The first interpretation is that things could not have gone differently, with the number of elements fewer than 100. If the inner workings of the atom could differ, there could be fewer than 100 elements. The second interpretation is that things could not have gone differently with the number 117 turning out to be fewer than 100. Intuitively, this claim is true. Of all the ways the world could have turned out, presumably there are no possibilities wherein 117 is fewer than 100. That 117 is greater than 100 is a necessary fact. The first interpretation, which seems to yield a false statement, is the ''de dicto'' interpretation. The second interpretation, which seems to yield a true statement, is the ''de re'' interpretation.
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| Another example: "The [[President of the USA]] in 2001 could not have been [[Al Gore]]". This claim seems false on a ''de dicto'' reading. Presumably, things could have gone differently, with the [[SCOTUS|Supreme Court]] not [[Bush v. Gore|claiming]] that Bush had won the [[United States presidential election, 2000|election]]. But it looks more plausible on a ''de re'' reading. After all, we might skeptically wonder of [[George W. Bush]] whether ''he'' could have been Al Gore. Indeed, assuming that ''being George Bush'' is an essential feature of George Bush and that this feature is incompatible with being Al Gore, a ''de re'' reading of the statement is true.
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| ==Representing ''de dicto'' and ''de re'' in modal logic==
| | * accessibility: |
| | ** Safari + VoiceOver: [https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:VoiceOver-Mac-Safari.ogv video only], [[File:Voiceover-mathml-example-1.wav|thumb|Voiceover-mathml-example-1]], [[File:Voiceover-mathml-example-2.wav|thumb|Voiceover-mathml-example-2]], [[File:Voiceover-mathml-example-3.wav|thumb|Voiceover-mathml-example-3]], [[File:Voiceover-mathml-example-4.wav|thumb|Voiceover-mathml-example-4]], [[File:Voiceover-mathml-example-5.wav|thumb|Voiceover-mathml-example-5]], [[File:Voiceover-mathml-example-6.wav|thumb|Voiceover-mathml-example-6]], [[File:Voiceover-mathml-example-7.wav|thumb|Voiceover-mathml-example-7]] |
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| | ** [https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:MathPlayer-Braille-Windows7-InternetExplorer.png Internet Explorer + MathPlayer (braille)] |
| | ** NVDA+MathPlayer: [[File:Nvda-mathml-example-1.wav|thumb|Nvda-mathml-example-1]], [[File:Nvda-mathml-example-2.wav|thumb|Nvda-mathml-example-2]], [[File:Nvda-mathml-example-3.wav|thumb|Nvda-mathml-example-3]], [[File:Nvda-mathml-example-4.wav|thumb|Nvda-mathml-example-4]], [[File:Nvda-mathml-example-5.wav|thumb|Nvda-mathml-example-5]], [[File:Nvda-mathml-example-6.wav|thumb|Nvda-mathml-example-6]], [[File:Nvda-mathml-example-7.wav|thumb|Nvda-mathml-example-7]]. |
| | ** Orca: There is ongoing work, but no support at all at the moment [[File:Orca-mathml-example-1.wav|thumb|Orca-mathml-example-1]], [[File:Orca-mathml-example-2.wav|thumb|Orca-mathml-example-2]], [[File:Orca-mathml-example-3.wav|thumb|Orca-mathml-example-3]], [[File:Orca-mathml-example-4.wav|thumb|Orca-mathml-example-4]], [[File:Orca-mathml-example-5.wav|thumb|Orca-mathml-example-5]], [[File:Orca-mathml-example-6.wav|thumb|Orca-mathml-example-6]], [[File:Orca-mathml-example-7.wav|thumb|Orca-mathml-example-7]]. |
| | ** From our testing, ChromeVox and JAWS are not able to read the formulas generated by the MathML mode. |
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| In [[modal logic]] the distinction between ''de dicto'' and ''de re'' is one of scope. In ''de dicto'' claims, any [[quantification|quantifiers]] are within the scope of the modal operator, whereas in ''de re'' claims the modal operator falls within the scope of the quantifier. For example:
| | ==Test pages == |
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| | ''De dicto'':
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| | Necessarily, some ''x'' is such that it is ''A''
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| | ''De re'':
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| | Some ''x'' is such that it is necessarily ''A''
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| === Willard van Orman Quine ===
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| [[W.V.O. Quine|Willard Van Orman Quine]] refers to [[David Kaplan (philosopher)|D. Kaplan]], who in turn credits [[Montgomery Furth]] for the term [[vivid designator]] in his paper ''Reference Modality''. He examines the separation between ''de re'' and ''de dicto'' statements and does away with ''de re'' statements, because ''de re'' statements can only work for names that are used [[Reference|referentially]].<ref>''On Quine, Transparency and Specificity in Intentional Contexts'', Andrea Bonomi, p.183</ref> In fact, both [[rigid designators]] and vivid designators are similarly dependent on context and empty otherwise. The same is true of the whole [[Quantification|quantified]] [[modal logic]] of [[necessity]]; for it collapses if [[essence]] is withdrawn.<ref>Quine, W.V.O., ''Quintessence, Reference and Modality'', pp.356-357</ref> | | ==Bug reporting== |
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| ==See also==
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| * [[Barcan formula]] | |
| * [[Latitudinarianism (philosophy)]]
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| * ''[[De se]]''
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| ==References==
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| {{Reflist}}
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| ==Bibliography== | |
| *Burge, Tyler. 1977. Belief de re. ''Journal of Philosophy'' 74, 338-362.
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| *Donnellan, Keith S. 1966. Reference and definite descriptions. ''Philosophical Review'' 75, 281-304.
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| *Frege, Gottlob. 1892. Über Sinn und Bedeutung. Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik 100, 25-50. Translated as On sense and reference by Peter Geach & Max Black, 1970, in Translations from the philosophical writings of Gottlob Frege. Oxford, Blackwell, 56-78.
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| *Kaplan, David. 1978. Dthat. In Peter Cole, ed., ''Syntax and Semantics'', vol. 9: Pragmatics. New York: Academic Press, 221-243
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| *Kripke, Saul. 1977. Speaker’s reference and semantic reference. In Peter A. French, Theodore E. Uehling, Jr., and Howard K. Wettstein, eds., Midwest Studies in Philosophy vol. II: Studies in the philosophy of language. Morris, MN: University of Minnesota, 255-276.
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| *Larson, Richard & Gabriel Segal. 1995. Definite descriptions. In Knowledge of meaning: An introduction to semantic theory. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 319-359.
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| *Ludlow, Peter & Stephen Neale. 1991. Indefinite descriptions: In defense of Russell. ''Linguistics and Philosophy'' 14, 171-202.
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| *Ostertag, Gary. 1998. Introduction. In Gary Ostertag, ed., Definite descriptions: a reader. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1-34.
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| *Russell, Bertrand. 1905. On denoting. ''Mind'' 14, 479-493.
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| *Wettstein, Howard. 1981. Demonstrative reference and definite descriptions. ''Philosophical Studies'' 40, 241-257.
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| *Wilson, George M. 1991. Reference and pronominal descriptions. ''Journal of Philosophy'' 88, 359-387.
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| ==External links==
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| * [http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/prop-attitude-reports/dere.html The ''De Re/De Dicto'' Distinction], Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
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| [[Category:Latin logical phrases]]
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| [[Category:Philosophical concepts]]
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| [[Category:Philosophy of language]]
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| [[Category:Modal logic]]
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| [[Category:Dichotomies]]
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| [[de:De re und de dicto]]
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| [[es:De dicto y de re]]
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| [[fr:De dicto et de re]]
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| [[fi:De dicto ja de re]]
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